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HOLMES v. SOUTH 
UPHOLDS TRIAL BY JURY.
By Samuel Gross
obby Lee Holmes was convicted of a brutal rape-
murder and sentenced to death. The only evidence
that connected him to the crime was fo ensic: a
palm print, and blood and fiber evidence. (Biological sam-
ples taken from the victim for two rape kits were compro-
mised and yielded no identifiable evidence.)
Holmes claimed that the state's forensic evidence was
planted and mishandled, and that the rape and murder
were committed by another man, Jimmy McCaw White.
At a pretrial hearing three witnesses testified that they saw
White near the victim's house at about the time of the
crime, and four others testified that they heard White
admit his guilt. White testified at the hearing and denied
that he had committed this crime or made the statements
to which the defense witnesses had testified. The trial
judge excluded all evidence about Jimmy White from
Holmes's trial.
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial
court, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the claim that this ruling violated Holmes's Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process, and his due
process right to present a defense. (The Court denied cert
on a related due process claim: After successfully object-
ing to all this evidence of White's guilt, the prosecutor
argued to the jury, in effect, "If Holmes didn't commit this
atrocious crime, who did?")
I filed an amicus brief in support of the defendant on
behalf of 40 evidence law professors. We argued that the
exclusion of the defendant's evidence violated his Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. Here's why:
The trial court excluded all testimony about White's
admissions as hearsay on the ground that they didn't qual-
ify for the exception for statements against penal interest.
(The trial judge then excluded the other evidence about
White as insufficiently probative, given that hearsay rul-
ing.) This hearsay ruling was insupportable. For one thing,
the exception for statements against penal interest-codi-
fied as South Carolina Rule of Evidence (SCRE)
804(b)(3)-had no application to the case since it requires
that the witness be unavailable, and White testified at the
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hearing. More important, the South Carolina rule on
inconsistent statements, SCRE 801 (d)(1)(A), is broader
than its federal counterpart; it excludes from the definition
of hearsay any statement by a testifying witness that is
inconsistent with his or her testimony. Since White testi-
fied and denied involvement in the crime, his prior state-
ments to the contrary were not hearsay under South
Carolina law.
The South Carolina Supreme Court ignored the trial
court's hearsay ruling entirely. Instead, it affirmed under
South Carolina's "third-party-guilt evidence rule," which it
modified for the occasion. It upheld the exclusion of the
defendant's evidence of innocence because, in its view, the
prosecution's evidence of guilt was overwhelming:
"[Holmes] simply cannot overcome the forensic evidence
against him to raise a reasonable inference of his own
innocence.... Given the overwhelming evidence of
appellant's guilt, the circuit court did not err by excluding
the evidence of third party guilt." (State v. Holmes, 605
S.E.2d 19, 24 (S.C. 2004).)
That's quite a holding: A
criminal defendant is not enti-
tled to present evidence of 
innocence to the jury if the 
judge (or in this case, the state
supreme court) decides the 
defendant is clearly guilty. It's a
frontal attack of the right to 
trial by jury. It's one thing to
exclude evidence because it's
unduly prejudicial or has low 
probative value, or to serve
some extrinsic policy. Evidence
that someone else did it is often excluded on some such
traditional basis, typically because it's too remote or spec-
ulative. It's another thing altogether to allow a judge (or
court) to decide that a defendant is so clearly guilty that
he or she doesn't get to present defense evidence of inno-
cence that is, if believed, direct and powerful.
The common law of evidence is in large measure a set
of rules that governs the circumstances under which
judges may keep evidence from juries. This power must be
carefully bounded. Just as "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
431 (1819), the power to exclude is the power to decide.
The South Carolina Supreme Court not only stepped way
over that line, but failed to articulate any limiting princi-
ple. Alibi evidence, like third-party guilt evidence, is
sometimes troublesome or misleading. If this rule were
constitutional, it could as easily apply to alibi evidence, or
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evidence of eyewitness error, or any other defense evi-
dence. Once the judge decides the defendant is guilty-
that "he simply cannot ... raise a reasonable inference of
his own innocence"-why let the jurors hear evidence to
the contrary? It would just confuse them.
The Supreme Court opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opin-
ion by Justice Alito, his first. The Court did not address
the jury trial issue, although Holmes's lawyers did pick it
up in their brief. That might be because the right to jury
trial is not mentioned in the question on which cert was
granted. More likely it was simply that the Court was not
interested in doing more than necessary to knock out the
South Carolina precedent. In any event, as one might
expect from a unanimous decision, the opinion says rela-
tively little.
The Court held that the exclusion of Holmes's evidence
violated his constitutional right to present a defense:
"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in
the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation Clauses of the
Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees crimi-
nal defendants 'a meaningful
opportunity to present a com-
plete defense.'" (126 S. Ct.
1731, quoting Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690
(1986).) That right is violated
by "evidence rules that
'infringe upon a weighty inter-
est of the accused' and are "'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate
to the purposes they are designed to serve."' (Id., quoting
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).)
Holmes does not define the contours of the right to "a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"--
unless you think you know what will be considered "arbi-
trary" and "disproportionate" next time around. But the
Court did endorse that right again, and it reaffirmed its
commitment to the scattering of earlier cases that reversed
state court convictions for exclusion of defense evidence:
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (testimony by
accomplice); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (cir-
cumstances of confession); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
58, 56 (1987) (hypnotically refreshed testimony by defen-
dant); and especially Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973).
Chambers, like Holmes, concerned a murder defendant
who was not allowed to present substantial evidence that
another man had confessed to the killing with which he
was charged. The Supreme Court held that this violated
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due process. (410 U.S. at 302-03.) Holmes could have
been decided simply as an application of Chambers,
except that the Court said in Chambers itself, and repeated
in Scheffer, supra, 523 U.S. at 316, that the decision in
Chambers was limited to "the facts and circumstances" of
that case. If nothing else, Holmes may remove that unfor-
tunate asterisk from the rule, however vague, if not from
the Chambers opinion. In fact, Holmes was a stronger
case for reversal than Chambers in two respects. First,
Chambers's jury did hear a considerable amount of evi-
dence about the other suspect; Holmes's jury heard none.
Second, the exclusion in Chambers was based on rules of
general application-Mississippi's hearsay rule, and its
prohibition against impeachment by the party that called a
witness-while the exclusion in
Holmes was based on a special
rule for criminal defendants who
are determined to be clearly 
guilty.Which brings me back to the of 
holding of the South Carolina
Supreme Court. Judge Alito 
points out that in order to con-
clude, as the South Carolina 
Supreme Court did, that the evi-
dence against Holmes is "over-
whelming" a court must evaluate
that evidence,
and where the credibility of the prosecution's wit-
nesses or the reliability of its evidence is not con-
ceded, the strength of the prosecution's case cannot
be assessed without making the sort of factual find-
ings that have traditionally been reserved for the
trier of fact and that the South Carolina courts did
not purport to make in this case.
(126 S. Ct. at 1734.)
This is a peculiar statement. I would have said that the
South Carolina Supreme Court did assess the reliability of
the state's evidence and found it "overwhelming," but I
don't sit on the U.S. Supreme Court. More important, does
Alito mean that it would have been unconstitutional for a
state court to base the exclusion of critical defense evi-
dence on a finding that has "traditionally been reserved for
the trier of fact" (i.e., the jury)-to wit, a finding that the
defendant is clearly guilty? That was the position of the
evidence professors' amicus brief, and one could interpret
the Court to agree, by implication. Or does Alito just
mean that if state courts want to make this sort of decision
they have to do it more explicitly than the South Carolina
Supreme did here?
I think he means something in between. I think the
intended message is something like this: "Everybody
knows that this sort of decision is the core function of
criminal juries. So please guys, don't make life hard for us
by ignoring such a basic common-law rule. If you do, we
might have to spell out the constitutional limits on your
power to exclude defense evidence, and you wouldn't
want us to do that, now would you?"
The right to present a defense
The path to Holmes begins with Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), which, as I mentioned,
also involved the exclusion of evidence that another man
committed the murder for which the defendant was con-
victed. The Court could have
held that Mississippi violated
Chambers's Sixth Amendment
Compulsory Process Clause
right to call witnesses. Instead
 it applied a vague due process
standard, and added the
intriguing observation that,
"In reaching this judgment,
we establish no new princi-
ples of constitutional law."
(410 U.S. at 302.) Holmes is
the latest of several cases that
apply this fuzzy due process right to "a meaningful oppor-
tunity to present a full defense."
It's no secret why the Court took this minimalist
approach. It reflects the justices' regard for "the respect tra-
ditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and
implementation of their own criminal trial rules and proce-
dures." (Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03.) The Court is not
about to generate a constitutional evidence code for crimi-
nal prosecutions. Extreme antidefendant rules, as in
Holmes-or extreme applications of conventional rules, as
in Chambers-may get lobbed off, but only if the Court
concludes that they have produced injustice. Chambers set
the pattern on that as well. It's widely believed that
Chambers won because the Supreme Court (or at least
Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion) thought he was
innocent. As the Court explained 23 years later,
"Chambers was an exercise in highly case-specific error
correction." (Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 52 (1996).)
Convicting the innocent
Recently, that last issue-the danger of convicting the
innocent, and especially of putting innocent defendants to
death-has been making waves in the Supreme Court.
From the look of it, there are more to come.
Bobby Lee Holmes was not the only death row defen-
dant to come before the Supreme Court last term and ask
for an opportunity to present evidence of innocence to a
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jury. There was also Paul Gregory House, but his case
requires a slight detour.
In 1993, in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, a frac-
tured majority of the Court agreed that "in a capital case a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional" even in the absence of any constitutional
error in obtaining the conviction. (Id. at 417.) The Court
also agreed that Herrera did not truly persuade them of his
actual innocence; nor has any capital defendant done so
since, in any court.
A few defendants, however, have met the stringent but
less extreme requirements of a 1995 Supreme Court case,
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298. Under Schlup a defendant
can get relief by persuading a federal court that if new
evidence of innocence were considered "it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found peti-
tioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at 327.) That
finding permits them to pursue federal habeas corpus
claims that would otherwise be procedurally barred, alleg-
ing constitutional error at trial.
House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006) is an application
of Schlup. House, also sentenced to death for a rape-mur-
der, assembled enough new evidence of innocence to per-
suade six judges on the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc that he
had met the standard of Herrera v. Collins of "actual inno-
cence." In fact (with no direct support for this remedy in
Herrera itself), they concluded that he must be released
forthwith. (House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 at 686-709 (6th Cir.,
en banc, 2004).) One judge found that House had satisfied
Schlup but not Herrera, and was entitled to a new trial (id.
at 709-10), and a majority of eight judges saw no constitu-
tional problem with putting House to death. (Id. at 670-86.)
House arrived in Washington with an air of controver-
sy. It was considered by the Court at five separate confer-
ences before cert was granted. Ultimately, House won five
to three, with Justice Kennedy writing for the Court that
House had satisfied Schlup, and Chief Justice Roberts dis-
senting. Decisions applying Schlup tend to be fact-inten-
sive-that's what Schlup is about, the strength of the evi-
dence of innocence in the particular case-and these opin-
ions are no exceptions. Much of the division on the Court
was expressed as a polite legalistic disagreement over the
degree of deference the Supreme Court should attach to a
district court's decision on whether, in light of the new
evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt." There were no fireworks.
And then, in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006),
three days before the end of the term, there was an erup-
tion. Marsh presented an apparently unrelated question: Is
it constitutional to instruct a capital sentencing jury that if
it finds that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
of a murder are in balance, it must sentence the defendant
to death? Five justices, in a majority opinion by Thomas,
said yes. But a four-justice dissent and solo concurrence
go off in another direction.
Justice Souter, in dissent, pointed out that "the period
starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts
under death sentences, in numbers never imagined before
the development of DNA tests." He concludes that given
"the hazards of capital prosecution" a preference for death
when "the evidence pro and con ... [is] in equipoise is
obtuse by any moral or social measure." (Id. at 2544-46.)
This drew a blistering response from Justice Scalia, who,
anticipating "sanctimonious criticism of America's death
penalty" from Europeans, felt compelled to "take the trou-
ble to point out"--at length-that the dissent "has nothing
substantial to support it" and "is willing to accept any-
body's say-so" about crucial facts. (Id. at 2531-39.)
What was that all about? A leftover fight from House v.
Bell, which (unlike Marsh) really was about the danger of
executing an innocent man? Or the opening shots in a new
battle-a battle over whether the 120-plus death row exon-
erations since 1973 amount to, as the dissent says, "a new
body of fact [that] must be accounted for" in deciding
what sort of death penalty the Constitution permits?
For now, Holmes v. South Carolina settles an easier
point. A unanimous Court held that a capital defendant
really is entitled to a fair chance to prove innocence in the
first instance, at trial. Concretely, if you're charged with
capital murder, and if you're lucky enough to have a
lawyer who gathers powerful evidence of your innocence,
unless there is a really good reason to the contrary, your
jury must be allowed to hear that evidence.
As for the rest, stay tuned. U
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